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The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on New York City and 
Washington, D.C. ushered in an American era defined largely by 
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national security concerns.1  In an effort to safeguard the United 
States and Americans everywhere from similar acts of destruction in 
the future, Congress passed the Uniting and Strengthening America 
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism Act of 2001 (“USA PATRIOT Act” or “Patriot Act”).2  
Congress passed the 400-page Act almost exactly six weeks after the 
events of September 11, 2001.3  The Patriot Act provides a lengthy 
and elaborate compilation of amendments to pre-existing federal law 
in areas such as surveillance, international money laundering, border 
protection, and foreign intelligence.4 
The staggeringly swift passage of this vast piece of legislation meant 
that members of Congress had little opportunity to review the Act’s 
myriad provisions before voting on it.5  One set of provisions 
expanded the pen register6 surveillance law, which traditionally had 
guided federal agents when monitoring the numbers dialed from a 
suspect’s telephone.7  In the eyes of civil libertarians and 
                                                          
 1. See Bart Kosko, Editorial, Your Privacy Is a Disappearing Act: A Digital Spying 
Net May or May Not Catch Terrorists, but It Will Ensnare Us, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 2, 
2001, at M5 (arguing that after the attacks, people living in the United States 
sacrificed various civil liberties for a “potential increase in protection from 
terrorists”). 
 2. See Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 272 (2001) (stating that the Act serves 
to “deter and punish” domestic and global terrorism, as well as “enhance law 
enforcement investigatory tools”); see also President’s Remarks, The White House, 
President Signs Anti-Terrorism Bill (Oct. 26, 2001) (lauding the Patriot Act as an 
“essential step in defeating terrorism” that will give law enforcement officials 
“important new tools”), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/ 
20011026-5.html. 
 3. See President’s Remarks, supra note 2 (verifying that President Bush signed 
the Act into law on October 26, 2001). 
 4. See Patriot Act § 1, 115 Stat. at 272-75 (displaying ten separate titles and a 
total of 158 subsections).  Each subsection makes numerous amendments to the 
United States Code, and these amendments vary in length and specificity.  Id. §§ 1-
1016, 115 Stat. at 275-402.  Some amendments replace existing terms, while others 
add new paragraphs and subsections to existing definitions and enforcement 
guidelines.  Id. 
 5. See Surveillance Under the “USA/Patriot” Act, ACLU Online Archives (Jan. 
1, 2002) (explaining that Congress passed the Patriot Act because the Bush 
Administration “bullied” Congress into it, and remarking that the bill went “straight 
to the [Congressional] floor with no discussion, debate, or hearings”), at 
http://www.aclu.org/Privacy/Privacy.cfm?ID=13465&c=130 (on file with the 
American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law). 
 6. See United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161 n.1 (1977) (defining pen 
register as “a mechanical device that records the numbers dialed on a telephone by 
monitoring the electrical impulses caused when the dial on the telephone is 
released”). 
 7. See Patriot Act §§ 201-25, 115 Stat. at 278-95 (introducing, under a heading 
titled “Enhanced Surveillance Procedures,” twenty-five sections describing the 
government’s authority to intercept and seize various forms of electronic 
communications); see also Jennifer C. Evans, Comment, Hijacking Civil Liberties: 
The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 933, 965-66 (2002) (noting that 
the amendments to the existing wiretap laws “expanded the ability of the Department 
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commentators across the political spectrum, the amendments to this 
area of the law jeopardize an already fragile privacy interest in the 
content of electronic, computer-based communications.8 
This Comment argues that the Patriot Act’s pen register 
amendments threaten First Amendment academic freedom 
guarantees in addition to Fourth Amendment privacy rights.9  This 
Comment suggests that academic research in controversial areas, such 
as terrorism or critical examination of national security policy, will 
suffer a particular burden as a result of the government’s enhanced 
Internet surveillance powers.10 
Part I examines how the Patriot Act expanded the government’s 
Internet surveillance power through seemingly innocuous 
“modifications” to the pen register law.11  Part I also reviews the law 
and technology on which today’s Internet monitoring is based.12  
Because privacy rights and free speech rights are closely intertwined 
in surveillance law, Part I briefly discusses concerns that the new pen 
                                                          
of Justice to place wiretaps” on computers and telephones of terrorism suspects, and 
that these amendments form the basis for the “Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism” portion of the USA PATRIOT Act’s title). 
 8. See ROBERT A. LEVY, CATO INST., THE USA PATRIOT ACT: WE DESERVE BETTER 
(n.d.) (expressing strong concern that the Patriot Act permits “rubber-stamp judicial 
supervision of phone and Internet surveillance”), available at http://www.cato.org/ 
current/terrorism/pubs/levy-martial-law.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2005) (on file with 
the American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law); see also Robin 
Mejia, More Surveillance on the Way, THE NATION, Oct. 30, 2002 (criticizing privacy 
invasions the Patriot Act made possible), at http://www.thenation.com/ 
doc.mhtml?i=20021111&s= mejia20021030. 
 9. See infra Part II.A (explaining that scholars have argued that the Act violates 
the Fourth Amendment probable cause standard and using Justice Douglas’ First 
Amendment “penumbra theory” to suggest that, in modern times, the freedom to 
conduct Internet research for scholarship purposes is a facet of the First Amendment 
guarantee of free inquiry). 
 10. See infra Part II.B-C (expanding upon the holdings and reasoning of prior 
case law to argue that broad restrictions on speech and poorly delimited government 
surveillance powers chill inquiry into and discussion of politically sensitive topics); see 
also R. Kenton Bird & Elizabeth Barker Brandt, Academic Freedom and 9/11: How 
the War on Terrorism Threatens Free Speech on Campus, 7 COMM. L. & POL’Y. 431, 
436-37 (2002) (observing that the post-September 11 threat to academic freedom is 
the greatest since the days of the Vietnam War protests). 
 11. See infra Part I.B (providing an in-depth discussion of how the post-Patriot 
Act pen register definition enabled the federal government to glean a considerable 
amount of personal information from records of Web use data); see also Rich 
Haglund, Comment, Applying Pen Register and Trap and Trace Devices to Internet 
Communications: As Technology Changes, Is Congress or the Supreme Court Best-
Suited to Protect Fourth Amendment Expectations of Privacy?, 5 VAND. J. ENT. L. & 
PRAC. 137, 145 (2003) (defending the amendments to the pen register/trap and trace 
statutes as “modifications” that fall short of creating a “new law of the Internet” and 
instead merely help police “keep up with changing” communications technologies). 
 12. See infra Part I.A (discussing in detail the Wiretap Act of 1968, the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986, and the evolving definition of pen register/trap 
and trace equipment). 
3
McClintick: Web Surfing In Chilly Waters: How The Patriot Act'S Amendments to
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2005
356 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 13:2 
register law endangers Fourth Amendment guarantees.13 
Part II begins by arguing that the First Amendment includes the 
right to conduct Internet research.14  Part II then assesses the 
constitutionality of the pen register law in light of the judiciary’s 
reaction to analogous laws that have sought to grant government 
authorities broad regulatory or surveillance powers.15  The 
constitutional assessment presupposes that the pen register statute, 
like any surveillance law, has two main functions that could implicate 
the First Amendment: the elimination of specific criminal activity and 
the more mysterious act of long-term data-gathering and record-
keeping.16  The final section of Part II suggests that the pen register 
law places a real and substantial burden on scholars that courts should 
not dismiss as merely theoretical.17 
Part III of the Comment proposes ways to preserve the enhanced 
surveillance provisions of the pen register amendments while 
continuing to allow American citizens and others to browse the 
Internet without fear of government intrusion into their scholarly 
activities.18  This Comment concludes that the current pen register 
law poses an unnecessary and unacceptable danger to the First 
Amendment guarantee of intellectual freedom.19 
                                                          
 13. See infra Part I.B (noting that journalists and civil liberties groups fear that 
government monitoring of Web-surfing activity burdens privacy rights because Web 
addresses can contain personal information); see also United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. 
for the E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) (explaining that national security 
cases are unique in that they involve a “convergence of First and Fourth Amendment 
values” with historic roots in the English “struggle for freedom of speech and press”). 
 14. See infra Part II.A (arguing that Internet research, as a modern-day 
component of freedom of inquiry, fits comfortably within the Supreme Court’s liberal 
and long-standing formulation of First Amendment guarantees). 
 15. See infra Part II.B-C (exploring the Supreme Court’s generally negative 
response to laws and regulations that chill intellectual endeavors by explicitly 
forbidding certain forms of speech or authorizing surveillance of politically 
controversial activities). 
 16. See infra Part II.C (noting that while the pen register law seeks to curtail 
criminal activity, it also goes beyond this objective and allows data-gathering for 
virtually any reason); see also E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. at 320 (conceptualizing 
“official surveillance” as a potentially oppressive government activity that serves the 
two objectives of “criminal investigation” or “ongoing intelligence gathering”). 
 17. See infra Part II.D (arguing that a scholar’s fear of Internet surveillance 
substantially chills academic activity and Constitutes a justiciable injury for which to 
seek a remedy in court). 
 18. See infra Part III (discussing strategies for redrafting portions of the pen 
register law or limiting its scope and duration to harmonize it with the panoply of 
First Amendment intellectual freedom guarantees). 
 19. See infra Conclusion (stating that the low evidentiary hurdle that law 
enforcement must overcome to secure an Internet pen register order burdens the 
First Amendment right to free inquiry and represents the triumph of national security 
considerations over Constitutional rights). 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Development of Pen Register Surveillance Law Prior to the 
Patriot Act 
Courts historically have resisted concluding that law enforcement 
violates a person’s Fourth Amendment rights when it secretly records 
and analyzes the telephone numbers that a person dials.20  Judicial 
reluctance to recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
telephone numbers also extends to the Internet, as several recent 
federal circuit decisions have shown.21  As a result, Congress largely 
has shouldered the burden of deciding which forms of electronic 
communication, and under what circumstances, merit privacy 
protection.22 
The first major piece of federal telephone-line surveillance 
legislation was Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968, commonly referred to as the Wiretap Act.23  This 
law proscribes the unauthorized collection and analysis of the 
contents of telephone conversations.24  The Wiretap Act explicitly 
permits, however, the use of pen register/trap and trace equipment.25 
Generally defined, a pen register is a mechanical device or 
                                                          
 20. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (holding that the 
monitoring of dialed phone numbers does not implicate the Fourth Amendment 
because people generally do not have a subjective privacy expectation “in the 
numbers they dial”). 
 21. See, e.g., United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp.2d 504, 508-09 (W.D. Va. 
1999) (concluding that the Fourth Amendment, when applied to the technology of 
the Internet, does not protect an Internet customer’s privacy expectation in personal 
information released to an Internet service provider); Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 
335-36 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in non-content 
Internet information, such as the user’s subscriber data because the user placed the 
information under the control of a third party); see also Orin S. Kerr, Internet 
Surveillance Law After the USA PATRIOT Act: The Big Brother That Isn’t, 97 NW. U. 
L. REV. 607, 630 (2003) (describing telephone and Internet surveillance law as a 
“constitutional vacuum” that federal statutory law, rather than judicially rendered 
constitutional interpretation, has filled). 
 22. See Kerr, supra note 21, at 630 (noting that Congress passed a law banning 
wiretapping before the Supreme Court held that wiretapping violates the Fourth 
Amendment, and that Congress has since conducted an ongoing review of 
surveillance statutes in light of evolving “social norms”). 
 23. See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510-2515 (2003) (listing definitions of surveillance terms 
and placing specific restrictions on the interception and disclosure of 
communications); see also Kerr, supra note 21, at 630 (noting that the Wiretap Act 
still regulates telephone monitoring today). 
 24. See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2511(1),(4)(a) (stating that those who intercept wire, oral, 
or electronic communications without a court order or proper certification will be 
fined, imprisoned for up to five years, or both). 
 25. See id. § 2511(2)(g)(i) (stating that, despite the prohibition on intercepting 
the substance of any communication, it “shall not be unlawful” for law enforcement 
agents to use a pen register or trap and trace device). 
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procedure that, when attached to a telephone line, monitors and 
records the electrical impulses generated by the act of dialing a 
telephone number.26  These impulses, analyzed together, reveal the 
numbers dialed from a given telephone but nothing about the 
conversations themselves.27  Telephone companies have long 
employed pen register technology for billing and various other 
purposes.28 
The complement to the pen register is the trap and trace device, 
which collects the numbers associated with incoming telephone 
calls.29  Like the pen register, the trap and trace device neither 
“hears” nor records the actual conversations of the party under 
surveillance.30  In light of these definitions, it seems that the Wiretap 
Act’s drafters never envisioned pen register/trap and trace equipment 
as technology that could collect the actual substance of 
communications.31 
As stated earlier, the U.S. Supreme Court recognizes no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the telephone numbers a person dials.32  
Instead, the Court has separated conceptually the number dialed 
from the ensuing conversation and has granted Fourth Amendment 
protection only to the latter.33  An analogous distinction exists 
between the address on an envelope and the letter inside: the former 
                                                          
 26. ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 265 F. Supp.2d 20, 22 n.3 (D.D.C. 2003) 
(quoting N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 161 n.1). 
 27. See id. (noting that pen registers record telephone numbers without 
overhearing oral communications and without indicating whether the suspect has 
completed the call). 
 28. See N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 174-75 (stating that phone companies regularly 
use pen registers to ensure correct dialing, check for overbilling, and to discover 
whether a customer is running a business with her home telephone). 
 29. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3127(4) (2003) (defining the trap and trace device in 
language virtually identical to that of the pen register definition, but stating that trap 
and trace devices capture incoming electronic impulses generated by dialing a 
telephone number).  Pen registers capture outgoing information only.  Id. § 3127(3). 
 30. See id. § 3127(4) (emphasizing that the “dialing, routing, addressing, and 
signaling” information that a trap and trace device captures shall not include the 
contents of any communication). 
 31. See N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 167-68 (analyzing the Wiretap Act and 
concluding that the Act’s drafters did not regard pen registers as a threat to privacy 
because these instruments do not record the contents of communications). 
 32. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (reasoning that, because all 
telephone users must transmit the numbers they dial to the telephone company, and 
because telephone users know that the company can make permanent records of the 
numbers dialed, people could not have an actual expectation of privacy in this 
information). 
 33. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (recognizing a 
constitutionally protected privacy interest in a conversation made from a telephone in 
a public booth, and adding that one who uses a telephone booth is “surely entitled to 
assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the 
world”). 
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is merely “addressing” information, while the latter is considered 
“content” information and thus falls within the protection of the 
Fourth Amendment.34  This distinction has allowed the pen register 
to play a very broad role in federal surveillance activities, but its post-
Patriot Act application is of questionable constitutional legitimacy.35 
The first statute explicitly governing federal pen register use 
appeared within a series of amendments to the Wiretap Act and 
eventually became part of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
of 1986 (“ECPA”).36  Under the ECPA, a magistrate “shall enter an ex 
parte order authorizing the installation and use of a pen register” if 
the investigator “has certified to the court that the information likely 
to be obtained . . . is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.”37  
The relevance standard is far less rigorous than probable cause.38  
Moreover, the Justice Department acknowledges that judicial approval 
of pen register/trap and trace equipment is a procedure that is 
“ministerial in nature.”39  Once federal law enforcement agents 
obtain the order, they may use the surveillance device for up to sixty 
days before requesting additional sixty-day extensions.40 
From its enactment up until the passage of the Patriot Act, the 
ECPA made it clear that law enforcement officials could use pen 
register equipment only to collect numbers dialed and sent over a 
                                                          
 34. See Surveillance Under the “USA/Patriot” Act, supra note 5 (discussing the 
two types of surveillance distinguished in the original pen register law). 
 35. See Kosko, supra note 1, at M5 (warning that the Patriot Act gives the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) broader powers to monitor Internet activity than 
before).  This is especially worrisome because no one knows whether the 
government’s data-gathering technology will properly separate Web content from 
Web addressing information.  Id. 
 36. See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3121-3127 (2003) (describing the procedures for the 
issuance of a pen register order as well as the rules governing law enforcement’s 
installation and use of a pen register). 
 37. Id. § 3123(a)(1). 
 38. See ROBERT M. BLOOM & MARK S. BRODIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 4.1 (2d ed. 
2000) (defining probable cause as an evidentiary hurdle that requires “specific facts, 
not simply conclusory assertions” that add up to more than a vague suspicion but less 
than proof beyond a reasonable doubt); see also Surveillance Under the 
“USA/Patriot” Act, supra note 5 (describing the evidentiary requirement for pen 
register use as “essentially non-existent”). 
 39. See COMPUTER CRIME AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SECTION, CRIMINAL 
DIVISION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING 
ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS (2002) [hereinafter SEARCHING AND 
SEIZING COMPUTERS] (explaining that a court will grant a pen register order without 
assessing the veracity of the stated facts if the applicant states her name, identifies the 
agency investigating the crime, and certifies that the desired information is relevant 
to the investigation), at http:// www.cybercrime.gov/s&smanual2002.htm (last visited 
Apr. 21, 2005). 
 40. See id. (describing the application and issuance procedures for a pen register 
order and stating that, during the time the pen register is in use, the investigating 
officer should not disclose its existence to anyone). 
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telephone line.41  Nevertheless, some courts assumed that the ECPA’s 
definition of the pen register was flexible enough to allow monitoring 
of computer network communications as well as telephonic 
communications.42  Despite the courts’ broader application, however, 
at least one federal magistrate judge adhered to the idea that pen 
registers were available only for telephonic surveillance.43 
B. How the Patriot Act Expanded the Surveillance Capacity of the Pen 
Register Law 
Widespread public anxiety after the September 11 tragedies 
spurred Congress to grant some of the Justice Department’s demands 
for enhanced surveillance capability.44  One result was the Patriot 
Act’s revisions to the pen register law, which redefined the pen 
register to cover Internet as well as telephone monitoring.45  Congress 
similarly expanded the definition of the trap and trace device.46  
While the Justice Department has pointed out that the pen register 
amendments expressly forbid the collection of the “contents of any 
communication,”47 journalists and commentators have discovered 
ambiguity in the new law because no bright-line distinction exists 
between addressing information and content on the Internet.48  The 
Patriot Act’s language, they argue, is far too simplistic to address this 
                                                          
 41. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3127(3) (1986) (amended 2001) (defining a pen register as 
a device that records “numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted on the telephone 
line” and noting that this statutory definition does not include devices used by a 
provider of a wire or electronic communication service). 
 42. See Kerr, supra note 21, at 634 (noting that a federal magistrate judge in Los 
Angeles granted an Internet pen register order despite his recognition that the 
drafters of the original pen register statute never imagined this use for the device). 
 43. See id. at 635 (noting that a magistrate judge in northern California denied a 
government application for an Internet pen register order after reviewing the ECPA’s 
pen register law and concluding that the law covered only telephonic devices). 
 44. See id. at 636 (explaining that the Justice Department had been “clamoring 
for changes to the antiquated surveillance laws for years”). 
 45. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3127(3) (2003) (defining a pen register as a “device or 
process which records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling 
information transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic 
communication is transmitted”). 
 46. See id. § 3127(4) (defining a trap and trace device as something that 
“captures the incoming electronic or other impulses which identify the originating 
number or other dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information”). 
 47. See SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS, supra note 39 (stating that the newly 
amended pen register law regulates the collection of “addressing and other non-
content information”); see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 3127(3) (permitting the use of a pen 
register to capture information so long as that information does not include the 
“contents of any communication”). 
 48. See Surveillance Under the “USA/Patriot” Act, supra note 5 (analogizing a list 
of Internet addresses to a list of purchased books, and arguing that both contain rich 
and revealing information). 
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puzzling problem.49 
The pen register law’s ambiguity stems from the idea that, unlike a 
telephone number, an Internet address contains an element of 
content.50  While a telephone number is strictly a sequence of digits, 
an Internet address could contain search terms, concepts, titles, and 
trademarks, as well as the names of businesses, schools, or political 
organizations.51  In light of the variety and abundance of words 
potentially present in an Internet address, the American Civil 
Liberties Union (“ACLU”) has characterized Internet addresses as a 
source of “intimate information that reveals who we are and what we 
are thinking about.”52  The expanded definition of the pen register, 
now addressing and signaling information in electronic 
communications, strongly suggests that government agents now may 
access lawful Internet addresses with nothing more than a pen register 
order.53 
II. OVERBREADTH IN THE PEN REGISTER AMENDMENTS AND THE 
DANGER TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
A.  The First Amendment Encompasses Freedom of Inquiry 
Civil libertarians generally have invoked the Fourth Amendment for 
their most withering attacks on the expanded pen register law.54  
                                                          
 49. See, e.g., NANCY CHANG, CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, THE USA 
PATRIOT ACT: WHAT’S SO PATRIOTIC ABOUT TRAMPLING ON THE BILL OF RIGHTS? 
(2001) (arguing that the Patriot Act’s pen register definition offers the government 
broad discretion in deciding what to monitor), available at http://www.ccr-
ny.org/v2/reports/docs/USA_PATRIOT_ACT.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2005). 
 50. See Surveillance Under the “USA/Patriot” Act, supra note 5 (observing that 
the term “Internet address” is a misnomer because a Web page is really the title of a 
document that a person downloads from a remote computer to her own computer). 
 51. See id. (explaining that the address of a Web page generated by filling out an 
online order form often contains the names of the products that the customer has 
selected for purchase). 
 52. See id. (noting, by way of example, that an approved pen register application 
could now make this result of a Google search available to law enforcement 
authorities: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&lr=&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF8&q= 
sexual+ orientation).  Because a person’s sexual orientation is a deeply personal 
matter, the ACLU argues that most people would expect these and other search 
results to remain private and protected.  Id. 
 53. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3127(3) (including Internet communications within the 
statutory definition of pen register).  But see Kerr, supra note 21, at 638-39 (arguing 
that, in the absence of the current pen register law and the court order requirement, 
there would be no federal privacy law whatsoever to restrict the government’s ability 
to monitor the Internet). 
 54. See, e.g., CHANG, supra note 49 (arguing that the Patriot Act launches a 
“three-pronged assault” on privacy rights that includes giving the government 
“unprecedented and largely unchecked surveillance power” and ability to monitor 
the Internet, permitting law enforcement agencies to circumvent probable cause 
when conducting wiretaps for national security purposes, and allowing the exchange 
9
McClintick: Web Surfing In Chilly Waters: How The Patriot Act'S Amendments to
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2005
362 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 13:2 
Unfortunately, this intense focus on Fourth Amendment rights largely 
has overshadowed discussion of the pen register law’s implications for 
First Amendment rights.55  Intimately linked to the issue of privacy in 
Internet use is the issue of free speech and, more specifically, 
intellectual freedom.56 
Courts have long recognized that the First Amendment protects far 
more than the mere oral or written expression of ideas.57  Justice 
Douglas, for instance, famously reasoned that each provision of the 
Bill of Rights possesses a “penumbra” that encompasses numerous 
unnamed but constitutionally protected activities.58  In a description 
of the rights that give the First Amendment “life and substance,” 
Justice Douglas employed his penumbra theory to argue that the 
Amendment protects not only freedom of speech and press but also 
“the right to read... and freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought, and 
freedom to teach.”59 
In modern times, the right to conduct Internet-based research for 
academic purposes is an important part of “freedom of inquiry,” and, 
as such, falls within the scope of the First Amendment.60  Intrusive law 
enforcement is nothing new.61  Throughout American history, 
                                                          
of information between criminal and intelligence operations). 
 55. See id. (arguing that the Patriot Act endangers not just Fourth Amendment 
rights but also First Amendment rights, such as freedom of political association and 
freedom to voice dissent, by broadening the definition of domestic terrorism to 
include activities that “appear to be intended . . . to influence the policy of a 
government by intimidation or coercion”). 
 56. See Surveillance Under the “USA/Patriot” Act, supra note 5 (explaining that 
the Patriot Act grants the federal government unfettered power to investigate 
people’s Internet and library usage, book purchases, travel habits, and other activities 
that the First Amendment protects). 
 57. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (holding that the 
right to family planning receives protection within a “zone of privacy” emanating 
from several constitutional amendments including First Amendment free speech 
guarantees as well as Fourth Amendment privacy guarantees).  The Court observed 
that the Constitution guarantees many individual rights that do not appear 
specifically in its text.  Id. 
 58. See id. at 484 (stating that numerous Supreme Court decisions over the years 
demonstrate that explicitly mentioned guarantees in the Bill of Rights have 
penumbras, formed by “emanations from those guarantees”). 
 59. Id. at 482. 
 60. See, e.g., Doe v. 2TheMart.com, Inc., 140 F. Supp.2d 1088, 1092 (W.D. Wash. 
2001) (stating that a civil subpoena compelling the disclosure of names of anonymous 
Internet users should satisfy a high threshold because First Amendment protections 
encompass Internet-based speech activity); see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 
(1997) (holding that regulation of the Internet demands nothing less than stringent 
First Amendment scrutiny because it provides an ideal forum for a vigorous exchange 
of thoughts and ideas). 
 61. See Robert A. Pikowski, An Overview of the Law of Electronic Surveillance 
Post September 11, 2001, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 601, 603 (2002) (discussing the history of 
surveillance law and noting that Congress passed the Communications Act of 1934 
with the partial goal of making wiretap evidence inadmissible in federal courts). 
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government surveillance has been an almost reflexive response to 
perceived threats to national security.62  However, the reckless data 
collection that the Patriot Act sanctions poses a uniquely modern 
dilemma: by exposing Internet addresses to government surveillance, 
the expanded pen register law may inhibit Internet-based scholarly 
inquiry into terrorism or national security policy.63  Though the new 
law does not ban explicitly research or any other First Amendment 
activity, there is little or no constitutional difference between an 
unstated burden and an outright ban on such activities.64 
B. Judicial Rejection of Past Legislative Attempts to  Regulate or 
Prohibit Intellectual Speech 
The U.S. Supreme Court has long viewed the right to exchange 
ideas freely as inseparable from freedom of intellectual inquiry.65  For 
this reason, the unfettered commerce of ideas ranks among the most 
fiercely protected activities in the United States.66  The relationship 
between freedom of inquiry and the freedom to share ideas received 
special attention in Sweezy v. New Hampshire.67 
At issue in Sweezy was an anti-”subversive behavior” statute that 
penalized a professor for discussing socialism in the classroom.68  In 
                                                          
 62. See Eric Lardiere, Comment, The Justiciability and Constitutionality of 
Political Intelligence Gathering, 30 UCLA L. REV. 976, 976 n.3 (1983) (tracing the 
origin of American political intelligence to 1860, when President Abraham Lincoln 
called for investigations of Northerners suspected of sympathizing with Southern 
secessionists). 
 63. See Brigitte Anderson & William Rossiter, Backward March!  The USA-Patriot 
Act and the Bill of Rights, 12 MONT. PROFESSOR 6, ¶ 27 (Spring 2002) (advising 
readers to “be careful what you put in the Google Search,” and warning that, under 
the expanded surveillance provisions of the Patriot Act, a graduate student 
researching Al Qaeda, a political scientist studying Sinn Fein, or an activist for 
Amnesty International all could be exposing their communications to the 
government and could become the target of investigation), available at 
http://mtprof.msun.edu/Spr2002/BAWRart.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2005). 
 64. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 826 (2000) 
(invalidating restrictive provisions of the Telecommunications Act on First 
Amendment grounds, and reasoning that an overbroad regulation deserves no 
“special consideration or latitude” simply because the regulation burdens, rather than 
blatantly suppresses, a constitutional right). 
 65. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 262-63 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring) (emphasizing the importance of shunning any government regulation 
that tends to “check the ardor and fearlessness of scholars,” and defining freedom of 
inquiry as freedom to examine, question, and engage in “disputation on the basis of 
observation”). 
 66. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (observing that the 
United States has a profound commitment to safeguarding academic freedom, 
“which is of transcendent value” to everyone). 
 67. See 354 U.S. at 250 (noting that freedom to express inflammatory political 
ideas is no less fundamental to a democratic society than freedom to acquire 
knowledge). 
 68. See id. at 246 (explaining that the statute in question comprehensively 
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striking down the statute for its broad sweep, the Court described the 
law as a “strait jacket” upon academic inquiry and warned that such a 
restriction on speech could severely hamper the learning process.69  
The Court supported its holding by reasoning that all areas of 
scholarship, and especially controversial ones, provide endless 
opportunities to gain wisdom and knowledge.70 
While scholars of terrorism or Islam may arouse the suspicion of 
government agents and become the targets of electronic surveillance, 
these subjects are no less valid as academic fields than is the study of 
Marxism.71  Moreover, like the academic activity at issue in Sweezy, 
Islamic studies and terrorism merit special protection because of, not 
despite, their controversial nature.72  For these reasons, burdening 
inquiry into the latter subjects is as unconstitutional an act as 
burdening inquiry into the former.73 
The Supreme Court issued a similar ruling several years later in 
Keyishian v. Board of Regents.74  The law at issue in Keyishian 
punished “treasonable” or “seditious” behavior without defining those 
two adjectives, and the Court reasoned that the law endangered free 
speech by creating uncertainty about the speech or conduct being 
regulated.75  As a means of vividly portraying the nightmarish 
                                                          
regulated subversive activities, with the goal of eliminating from state employment 
any person who commits an act detrimental to the United States or its constitutional 
form of government). 
 69. See id. at 250 (asserting that students, and the teachers who guide them, are 
vital to the preservation of democracy, and cautioning that “[s]cholarship cannot 
flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust”). 
 70. See id. (arguing that researchers have not explored any field so thoroughly 
that new discoveries are impossible, and that this may be especially true in fields 
“where few, if any, principles are accepted as absolutes”). 
 71. See Bird & Brandt, supra note 10, at 449 (observing that, for many years prior 
to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, scholars had been exploring the origins 
of Islamic fundamentalism and dissatisfaction with U.S. foreign policy). 
 72. See AMERICAN COUNCIL OF TRUSTEES AND ALUMNI, DEFENDING CIVILIZATION: 
HOW OUR UNIVERSITIES ARE FAILING AMERICA AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 6-7  
(2002) (asserting that choosing to study Islam instead of American history is 
considered tantamount to stating that Americans were responsible for the deaths and 
destruction of September 11, 2001), available at http://www.goacta.org/ 
publications/reports/defciv.pdf (on file with American University Journal of Gender, 
Social Policy and the Law). 
 73. See Kathryn Martin, Note, The USA PATRIOT Act’s Application to Library 
Patron Records, 29 J. LEGIS. 283, 290-91 (2003) (noting that the First Amendment 
includes the right to receive speech and protects the efforts of a “curious mind” to 
learn more about political or world views with which many may disagree). 
 74. See 385 U.S. at 597-98 (noting the oppressive nature of a New York statutory 
provision that broadly called for the removal of any public-school employee 
responsible for any “treasonable or seditious word or words or the doing of any 
treasonable or seditious act or acts”). 
 75. See id. at 598 (comparing the statutory provision to the Sedition Act of 1798, 
which similarly failed to specify the meaning of “seditious,” and cautioning that the 
absence of a definition of the word “treasonable” in the statutory provision makes this 
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consequences of such a vague restriction, Justice Brennan invoked the 
image of a frightened academic who can only “guess what conduct or 
utterance may lose him his position.”76  Furthermore, in Keyishian, as 
in Sweezy, the Court employed the metaphor of a “strait jacket” to 
illustrate the danger of broad regulations on intellectual life.77 
A strait jacket on scholarship similar to the ones discussed in Sweezy 
and Keyishian exists today.  The pen register law permits authorities 
to record Internet addressing information whenever it becomes 
relevant to a criminal investigation.78  This language allows broad 
discretion in the gathering of Internet addresses from a search.79  In 
Sweezy, the distinction between a subversive person and a loyal one 
was unclear.80  In Keyishian, the teachers feared crossing the shadowy 
line between seditious and non-seditious acts.81  Scholars today could 
find that the line between what is relevant and irrelevant to a criminal 
investigation likewise lies in shadow, causing education to suffer as a 
result.82 
Sweezy and Keyishian are two examples of lawmakers’ failed efforts 
to ferret out socially disruptive speech and conduct at the expense of 
intellectual freedom.83  Other statutes have burdened academic 
inquiry by regulating access to inflammatory or obscene books.  The 
                                                          
word “no less dangerously uncertain”). 
 76. See id. at 604 (arguing that only extremely precise laws that clearly alert 
teachers of the forbidden behavior can combat the chilling effect on First 
Amendment rights because these rights cannot survive without “breathing space”). 
 77. See id. at 603 (warning of imperiling America’s freedom by “impos[ing] any 
strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities”) (quoting 
Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250). 
 78. See Patriot Act § 216, 115 Stat. at 290 (amending the pen register law to allow 
law enforcement authorities to collect the addressing information of any electronic 
communication that may seem relevant to criminal activity). 
 79. See SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS, supra note 39 (stating somewhat 
paradoxically that the distinction between addressing information and content 
applies to the Internet, despite the fact that there can sometimes be “debate” about 
what constitutes content in electronic communications). 
 80. See 354 U.S. at 246 (noting that the definition of subversive persons in the 
statute casts a net over far more people than just those who seek violent overthrow of 
the government). 
 81. See 385 U.S. at 599 (emphasizing that the definition of seditious is virtually 
limitless, and theorizing that the law could punish a teacher who carries a copy of the 
Communist Manifesto in public). 
 82. See Anderson & Rossiter, supra note 63 (predicting that the vague language 
in the Patriot Act may create “minefields of study,” such as aerosol biology or Middle 
Eastern studies, that students will avoid pursuing for fear of intrusive surveillance or 
criminal prosecution). 
 83. See Bird & Brandt, supra note 10, at 446 (describing the statutes at issue in 
Sweezy and Keyishian as “sweeping and often clumsy attempts” to curtail subversive 
behavior, and suggesting that these two cases stand for the bedrock principle that 
“the state may not use universities as a weapon in an overbroad and ill-defined fishing 
expedition”). 
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Supreme Court examined and rejected such a statute in Bantam 
Books v. Sullivan.84  Like the Patriot Act’s pen register amendments, 
the law at issue in Bantam Books made it relatively easy for the 
authorities to cast a watchful eye on activities intimately related to 
academic inquiry, regardless of whether those activities were illegal.85 
In striking down the statute, the Court reasoned that it would have 
unduly burdened adults by making it much harder for them to 
acquire books deemed too obscene for young people.86  Remaining 
faithful to the spirit of this decision nearly forty years later, the Court 
held that a vaguely worded statute forbidding sexually explicit 
depictions of minors would prevent adults from reading textbooks 
and classic works of literature.87 
The Supreme Court is likely to be as critical of legal interference 
with Internet research as it was of book regulation, given the similar 
educational roles of the two media.88  The Court addressed the 
relationship between education and Internet regulation when it 
evaluated the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (“CDA”).89  Like 
the pen register law, the CDA suggested that a broad range of Web-
based activity could trigger an investigation or criminal liability.90  In 
striking down the CDA for failing to define “indecent” and “patently 
offensive” communications, the Court once again refused to allow 
sweeping regulations to burden the learning process.91  Since this 
                                                          
 84. See 372 U.S. 58, 60 (1963) (striking down a Rhode Island statute that 
established a local commission to investigate and prosecute those who sold books 
containing “obscene, indecent, or impure” language).  Another part of the statute 
called upon the commission to promote morality by investigating situations that 
could cause “undesirable behavior in juveniles."  Id. 
 85. See id. at 72 (holding that the operation of the commission was nothing more 
than a “scheme of state censorship,” and noting that the law creating the commission 
sought not to advise booksellers but to “suppress” their lawful activities). 
 86. See id. at 71 (arguing that the commission’s mandate was vague, resulting in 
book distributors’ elimination of a wide variety of adult books and forcing adults to 
cross state lines in order to find these prohibited publications). 
 87. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 252-54 (2002) 
(invalidating on First Amendment grounds the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 
1996, which prohibited any virtual or actual visual depiction of minors engaging in 
sexual conduct).  The law’s broad language would, for example, prevent adults from 
looking at photos in psychology textbooks or watching film adaptations of 
Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet.  Id. at 246-48. 
 88. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 853 (analogizing an Internet search to the act of 
selecting books from a “vast library including millions of readily available and indexed 
publications”). 
 89. See id. at 849 (examining two provisions of the Communications Decency Act 
of 1996 that sought to shield minors from “indecent” or “offensive” Internet-based 
communications). 
 90. See id. at 859 (noting that the statute subjected violators of the Act’s 
provisions to a fine and/or a prison sentence of up to two years in length). 
 91. See id. at 878 (criticizing the open-ended provisions of the law for their 
potential to ban artistic renderings of nude images, as well as Web-based inquiries 
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decision, other courts confronting challenges to similar legislation 
have embraced the theory that broad regulation of Internet use chills 
inquiry into various critical issues.92 
The aforementioned decisions show that legislatures generally have 
failed in their attempts to regulate educationally valuable speech, 
books, or electronic communications by enacting statutes containing 
sweeping proscriptive language.93  The Patriot Act’s pen register law 
limits the exercise of First Amendment rights to an equal, if not 
greater degree, by targeting the vast category of Web-browsing 
information that law enforcement officials may deem relevant to a 
criminal investigation.94  In so doing, the law ignores the enormous 
contribution that modern communications technologies play in the 
exploration of ideas.95  On a more general level, this impediment to 
free speech violates the constitutional requirement that a law clearly 
and accurately draws the line between unfettered and regulated 
speech at all times.96 
C. Beyond Specific Proscriptions: How Indiscriminate Data-Gathering 
Chills Intellectual Activity 
The pen register law, like the statutes under attack in Sweezy, 
Keyishian, and the later cases discussed in the previous section, 
provides only a vague description of the activity under regulation.97  
The difference between those statutes and the pen register law, 
however, is that the former generally provided a swift and clear 
punishment for a violation of the proscribed behavior, while the latter 
allows law enforcement to generate and compile records of Internet 
                                                          
into such subjects as prison rape, safe sex, and birth control). 
 92. See, e.g., ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1152-53, 1160 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(invalidating a New Mexico law proscribing computer communications depicting 
“sexual conduct,” and noting that the plaintiffs’ Internet-based “speech” included 
informative discussions of art, literature, sexuality, and civil rights issues). 
 93. See, e.g., Playboy, 529 U.S. at 827 (striking down on First Amendment 
grounds a provision of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 requiring cable 
television providers to “scramble” erotic programming or limit it to late hours). 
 94. See Evans, supra note 7, at 977 (arguing that the extremely low evidentiary 
requirement of relevance allows law enforcement to visit Web sites, review e-mail 
communications, and severely undermine the privacy rights of many people whose 
activities have nothing to do with the government’s criminal investigation). 
 95. See Playboy, 529 U.S. at 818 (characterizing technology as a “revolution” that 
“expands the capacity to choose” among competing opinions and statements about 
esthetics, morality, and other academic subjects). 
 96. See id. at 817 (cautioning that a failure to draw the fine line properly between 
guaranteed and prohibited speech “exacts an extraordinary cost” of preventing 
people from seeking knowledge without the intrusion of law enforcement). 
 97. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3123(a)(2) (explaining that the court will grant the pen 
register order after a showing that the “information likely to be obtained . . . is 
relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation”). 
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addresses for no clear purpose.98  This potential for abusive and 
indiscriminate data-gathering reinforces the argument that the 
expanded pen register law, alone and in conjunction with other 
provisions of the Patriot Act, chills scholarly activity.99 
Legislators must narrowly tailor any law that authorizes data 
collection on teachers in pursuit of a legitimate state purpose.100  In 
Shelton v. Tucker, the Court determined that a statute requiring 
teachers to disclose group membership lists inhibits their “free play of 
the spirit” and, therefore, fails the narrow tailoring analysis.101  
Because the pen register law makes it relatively easy for authorities to 
collect lists of Web addresses that a teacher or student visits, it 
burdens their “free play of the spirit” in a similar way.102  A slightly 
earlier decision had emphasized that such a close nexus between the 
governmental purpose for proscribing the speech or activity and the 
restraint upon the freedom to express becomes critical when 
unpopular views are vulnerable to suppression.103  The pen register 
law does not satisfy a narrow tailoring analysis because it is unclear 
that gathering and analyzing Internet address information will achieve 
its intended governmental interest—namely, preventing acts of 
terrorism.104 
Even when the legislative purpose is more urgent and compelling 
                                                          
 98. Compare Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 614 (displaying the full anti-sedition statute, 
which provided for the “disqualification or removal” of teachers who violate its 
provisions), with SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS, supra note 39 (noting that the 
Pen/Trap Statute broadly defines pen register devices, which applies to a wide range 
of communications technologies that capture and store addressing information). 
 99. Cf. Michael N. Dolich, Note, Alleging a First Amendment “Chilling Effect” to 
Create a Plaintiff’s Standing: A Practical Approach, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 175, 175-76 
(1994) (illustrating the chilling effect of government surveillance by describing a 
hypothetical person who avoids a public meeting because the FBI will monitor it). 
 100. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (explaining that the 
principle of narrow tailoring requires lawmakers to employ the least drastic and 
restrictive means of achieving the legitimate governmental interest). 
 101. See id. at 487 (explaining that the Bill of Rights protects teachers’ freedom to 
think and act upon their thoughts).  The Arkansas statute at issue in Shelton required 
every state teacher to submit a list of all organizations to which he or she belonged 
during the previous five years.  Id. at 488. 
 102. See SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS, supra note 39 (describing the 
procedure for obtaining a pen register order, and explaining that the judicial role in 
approving pen register devices is only “ministerial” (quoting United States v. Fregoso, 
60 F.3d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1995))). 
 103. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 464-66 (1958) (invalidating a policy 
requiring the NAACP to reveal its membership lists to the state, and reasoning that 
the state’s goal of identifying illegal business practices was an insufficient justification 
for burdening the NAACP’s activities). 
 104. See Kerr, supra note 21, at 636 (stating that the attacks of September 11 “did 
not directly implicate the Internet”); see also Martin, supra note 73, at 298 (arguing 
that monitoring a person’s reading activity to determine if she is a terrorist is no more 
effective than monitoring a person’s dietary habits to determine if she is Moslem). 
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than a teacher’s competency or the discovery of illegal business 
activities, the Supreme Court insists that government data collection 
activities still satisfy a narrow tailoring analysis.105  The Court 
remained loyal to this principle, for instance, in Gibson v. Florida 
Legislative Investigation Committee, where the Court found the 
express purpose of the legislation was the identification of communist 
threats to national security.106  The Court emphasized that a broad 
list-making power deprives free speech guarantees of the “breathing 
space” essential to their survival.107 
The federal government’s fearful efforts to combat communist 
infiltration during the McCarthy era parallel the government’s 
reaction to the modern terrorist threat.108  Indeed, some 
commentators assert that the current war on terrorism will wreak even 
more long-term havoc on civil liberties than did McCarthyism.109  
Whether the perceived threat is communism or terrorism, national 
security is a vital governmental interest that the Court has, at times, 
used to justify extraordinarily repressive measures.110  Nevertheless, 
the Court’s decisions in both Gibson and in subsequent cases firmly 
establish that broad data collection for national security purposes 
must yield to the right to learn, question, and research controversial 
topics.111  This principle should apply equally to the present-day 
                                                          
 105. See Shelton, 364 U.S. at 488 (stating that even a legitimate and substantial 
government purpose can never justify means “that broadly stifle fundamental 
personal liberties” if there is the possibility of an equally effective and more closely 
tailored statute). 
 106. See 372 U.S. 539, 549 (1963) (rejecting the argument that it is permissible to 
require admittedly legitimate organizations to disclose their membership records 
when the purpose of such a requirement is the general prevention of communist 
infiltration). 
 107. See id. at 544 (arguing that data collection and other subtle forms of 
governmental interference are just as suspect as more overt attempts at regulation 
when these methods restrict the exercise of First Amendment guarantees). 
 108. See Lardiere, supra note 62, at 976-77 (predicting, nearly two decades before 
the September 11 terrorist attacks, that if the government perceives a threat to its 
stability as it did with communism until 1976, the government will again resort to 
unconstitutional data-gathering against innocent citizens). 
 109. See, e.g., Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, Nadine Strossen and Freedom of 
Expression: A Dialogue with the ACLU’s Top Card-Carrying Member, 13 GEO. MASON 
U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 185, 206-07 (2003) (reproducing a statement of ACLU president 
Nadine Strossen, who argues that much of the civil rights abuse of the McCarthy era 
ended with the dismantling of congressional committees, whereas the civil liberties 
violations the Patriot Act sanctions will remain indefinitely because statutes are very 
difficult to repeal once they are “on the books”). 
 110. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944) (holding that 
the internment of Japanese-Americans after the attack on Pearl Harbor was an 
acceptable means of satisfying the overwhelmingly important goal of national 
security). 
 111. See Gibson, 372 U.S. at 567 (Douglas, J., concurring) (arguing that far-
reaching surveillance and record-keeping powers allow the government to “look over 
the shoulder of everyone who reads” and ultimately discourage free inquiry); see also 
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scholar whose attempts to explore controversial topics may appear to 
some as evidence of criminality or terrorism.112 
Freedom of inquiry suffers when government data-gathering 
burdens the scholar’s search for information, and this is no less true 
outside of a classroom or organizational setting.113  Lamont v. 
Postmaster General,114 decided just two years after Gibson, protected 
the First Amendment rights of an individual who sent for and 
received communist propaganda via the postal service.115  The Court 
explained its reasoning by noting that postal mail functions as a 
vehicle for the “flow of ideas.”116 
Because searching the Internet is in many ways the modern 
equivalent of sending away for published, hard-copy information, the 
Lamont Court’s “flow of ideas” metaphor accurately characterizes 
computer-based communications.117  The pen register laws, like the 
postal service statute, create an opportunity for the government to 
gather data whenever it determines that the activity of the 
information-seeker is controversial.118  As mentioned earlier, the 
Constitution combats this phenomenon by guaranteeing a large 
degree of anonymity to those who exercise their right to explore 
controversial subjects.119 
                                                          
E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. at 314-21 (striking down a federal statute authorizing the 
President and Attorney General to gather and maintain intelligence pertaining to 
subversive forces, and reasoning that such official surveillance chills criticism of 
government policies). 
 112. See Sean Mussenden et al., USF Professor Arrested on Terror-Related 
Charges, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 21, 2003, at A1 (discussing the arrest of Professor 
Sami Al-Arian, whom the FBI accused of using the “academic environment” at the 
University of South Florida as a “staging point” for terrorist activity on behalf of the 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad). 
 113. See Bird & Brandt, supra note 10, at 437 (noting that the notion of academic 
freedom, as defined by the American Association of University Professors and 
recognized by law, includes the right to talk and write about matters outside of the 
classroom and beyond one’s field of expertise). 
 114. 381 U.S. 301 (1965). 
 115. See id. at 305-07 (invalidating on First Amendment grounds a federal postal 
service statute that allowed the Postmaster General to detain all mail appearing to 
contain communist political propaganda until the addressee submitted a reply card 
requesting delivery of the mail). 
 116. See id. at 306 (noting that the postal service statute hinders the flow of mail, 
and thus the “flow of ideas,” by requiring administrative officials to inspect the mail 
for communist propaganda, set it aside if it contains such propaganda, write the 
addressee about the problem, and await the reply card before finally sending the mail 
to the addressee). 
 117. See Surveillance Under the “USA/Patriot” Act, supra note 5 (noting that 
visiting a Web page is really the act of downloading the information from an 
electronic document on a remote computer to the Web-surfer’s computer). 
 118. See Lamont, 381 U.S. at 307 (expressing concern that schoolteachers and 
other public officials will fear disastrous consequences if the government believes that 
they are sending for and receiving treasonous materials). 
 119. See NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462-63 (invoking First Amendment protection after a 
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Legal scholars and commentators often invoke George Orwell’s 
“Big Brother” concept when attempting to show how ever-present, 
real-time government surveillance creates anxiety and diminishes free 
will.120  Generally, this effect still arises even if the person under 
surveillance knows that her activities are lawful.121  Courts have 
recognized, for instance in White v. Davis, that free speech and 
inquiry suffer dramatically when undercover officers sit in college 
classrooms and compile records of their observations.122  The 
preservation of the classroom as the “crucible of new thought” has 
guided these decisions.123  Given the enormous amount of 
information it offers, one could view the Internet as another crucible 
of thought.124  In light of this analogy, the use of a pen register to 
collect Web-surfing activity is no less Orwellian than the use of 
undercover policemen to monitor classroom discussions.125 
A fear of Orwellian surveillance procedures, however, is not 
necessarily enough to invalidate a national security or crime-control 
measure.126  In Anderson v. Sills,127 for example, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court upheld police department policies authorizing official 
                                                          
showing that sharing membership lists and records with others has exposed individual 
members to loss of employment, threats of physical harm, and general public hostility 
in the past and could bring about these same results again). 
 120. See James P. Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value in Information Privacy, 78 
WASH. L. REV. 1, 12 (2003) (observing that data-collection systems, like the radically 
authoritarian regime known as “Big Brother” in George Orwell’s novel, 1984, are an 
ongoing form of observation that limit freedom by tightening the government’s hold 
over various aspects of citizens’ lives). 
 121. See id. at 15 (noting that most people legitimately fear that information 
collected about them could be used in a derogatory or dangerous manner, even 
where the information is mundane and harmless). 
 122. See 533 P.2d 222, 229 (Cal. 1975) (invalidating on free-speech grounds a 
policy of the Los Angeles Police Department that allowed undercover policemen to 
attend university classes and meetings in order to take notes for their files).  The goal 
of this practice was the anticipation and prevention of future crime.  Id. at 227. 
 123. See id. at 231 (describing the campus classroom as sacred and warning that 
classroom surveillance practices by undercover police endanger everyone’s sense of 
security in free expression and is only one step removed from a totalitarian regime). 
 124. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 851-52 (noting that Internet newsgroups accommodate 
about 100,000 daily message postings, allowing for the exchange of information on 
everything from music to politics, and concluding that the Internet is as varied and 
colorful as the full range of human thoughts). 
 125. See Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth 
Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1103-04 (2002) (arguing that the 
absence of checks on the government’s power to collect Web-surfing information 
poses a threat to anonymity in intellectual pursuits, and that such an absence is one 
facet of an anti-democratic culture). 
 126. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (upholding the Secretary of 
State’s revocation of an American citizen’s passport because it is “obvious and 
unarguable” that no government interest is more important than national security). 
 127. 265 A.2d 678 (N.J. 1970). 
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data-gathering at public events.128  Though Sills may seem at odds 
with White, the specific rights of education and freedom of inquiry 
were more directly at stake in the latter case.129  Because these rights 
have an exalted position among the First Amendment guarantees, 
burdens on those rights may invite even greater scrutiny than burdens 
on the right to assemble.130 
The decisions above also suggest that courts evaluate data-gathering 
methods more rigorously if a legislative body has sanctioned those 
methods.131  The Supreme Court provided support for this idea two 
years after Sills when it upheld army surveillance tactics not unlike 
those at issue in Sills.132  In each case, the data-gathering occurred 
pursuant to a general policy or practice rather than an actual law.133  
The Internet surveillance provisions in the pen register law, by 
contrast, are a product of Congress and therefore should not escape 
full judicial review.134 
D.  Internet Surveillance Anxiety as a Justiciable Injury 
Given the Laird Court’s refusal to address the merits of, let alone 
strike down, the Army’s broad surveillance tactics, a student or 
teacher may have difficulty persuading a court that the Patriot Act 
chilled her Internet use enough to warrant a remedy.135  However, 
                                                          
 128. See id. at 688-89 (upholding the constitutionality of an internal police 
department memorandum that urged law enforcement officials to exercise their 
crime-prevention duties by gathering intelligence on rallies, demonstrations, and 
other public events because such actions were necessary and reasonable for police to 
accomplish their mission). 
 129. Cf. id. at 682-83 (emphasizing that the plaintiffs only “envision” harassment 
and injury as a result of police surveillance at protests, demonstrations, marches, or 
other purely hypothetical activities). 
 130. See Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603 (discussing the inherent value of academic 
freedom and stating that it is a “special concern of the First Amendment”). 
 131. See, e.g., Sills, 265 A.2d at 684 (noting that the surveillance provisions 
appeared in a general memorandum circulated among law enforcement agencies, 
and concluding that the Constitution demands precision only of a legislative 
enactment). 
 132. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1972) (holding that Army surveillance 
policies do not cause an unconstitutional chilling effect on citizens’ exercise of their 
First Amendment rights). 
 133. See, e.g., id. at 16 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting that the Army’s activities 
under challenge result from Pentagon policy rather than law).  If Congress had 
passed an actual law authorizing surveillance this extensive, “a most serious 
constitutional problem” would exist.  Id. 
 134. See LEVY, supra note 8 (noting that the Patriot Act subverts the separation of 
powers doctrine by authorizing “rubber-stamp judicial supervision” of government 
surveillance of the Internet, and warning that the Executive branch will not always use 
its power in benevolent or constitutional ways). 
 135. See Laird, 408 U.S. at 11 (explaining that the complainant lacked standing to 
allege a chilling effect because the Army’s policy was not “regulatory, proscriptive, or 
compulsory in nature” and did not injure the complainant through any regulations or 
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while the pen register laws are neither directly regulatory nor 
proscriptive, the harm that they could inflict on an Internet 
researcher is real.136  Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has not 
distinguished between a burden on a First Amendment right and the 
wholesale elimination of that right.137  Indeed, a legally actionable 
injury can result from a system of ongoing surveillance that creates 
nothing more than the mere possibility of a First Amendment 
burden.138 
The arguments above support the proposition that, Laird 
notwithstanding, the question of what constitutes a justiciable First 
Amendment injury remains unsettled.139  For example, due to the 
ease with which the government can obtain a pen register order and 
monitor Web sites, a person may avoid researching terrorism via the 
Internet.140  This type of “chill” stems from a fear of punishment for 
exploring or expressing an unpopular idea, and several courts have 
recognized that such a fear is a valid injury.141 
The fear may be particularly acute, and the injury exceptionally 
                                                          
proscriptions). 
 136. See Nehf, supra note 120, at 13 (comparing the victim of data collection to 
the protagonist in Franz Kafka’s The Trial, who feels terrified, powerless, and 
vulnerable upon being arrested and learning that the police have been monitoring 
his activity). 
 137. See Lamont, 381 U.S. at 308-09 (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that 
regulations that indirectly control speech require a compelling state interest because 
the inhibition of First Amendment rights is as unconstitutional as the prohibition of 
those rights); see also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438-39 (1963) (invalidating 
restrictions on the business activities of NAACP lawyers and noting that even 
unintended encroachment on free speech guarantees are unconstitutional). 
 138. See Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144, 161 (D.D.C. 1976) 
(holding that the Army’s electronic surveillance and reporting procedures may call 
for a damages remedy because even attempted restraints on First Amendment 
freedoms by government actors cause an injury that demands redress); see also 
Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 407 F. Supp. 115, 119-20 (N.D. Ill. 1975) 
(holding that the police department’s constant surveillance activities may have chilled 
plaintiffs’ exercise of their First Amendment rights, thereby presenting a justiciable 
controversy). 
 139. See Dolich, supra note 99, at 179-80 (noting that legal scholars have roundly 
criticized the Laird decision for leaving “many important questions unanswered” and 
creating much ambiguity as to whether a chilling effect creates a legally redressable 
harm). 
 140. See Charles Levendosky, Patriot Act Chills First Amendment Freedoms, ABS-
CBN News.com (Jan. 22, 2003) (arguing that the Patriot Act chills one’s freedom to 
read, and speculating that the Act’s surveillance laws may cause someone who reads a 
book about revolution to be a suspect in a terrorism investigation), at 
http://fact.trib.com/1st.lev.noinfoDOJ.html (on file with the American University 
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law). 
 141. See, e.g., Levin v. Harleston, 966 F.2d 85, 90-91 (2d Cir. 1992) (concluding 
that a university professor’s fear of discipline for expression of a controversial race 
theory amounted to a cognizable injury entitling him to relief); United Food & 
Commercial Workers Int’l Union v. IBP, Inc., 857 F.2d 422, 429-30 (8th Cir. 1988) 
(holding that a restrictive statute injured union workers by causing them to fear arrest 
or prosecution for the constitutionally protected activity of picketing). 
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severe, if one considers the pen register definition’s relationship to 
other parts of the Patriot Act.  Even an innocent person reasonably 
may worry that investigators will, at some future date, interpret the 
fruits of their surveillance as evidence of terrorism or other forms of 
criminal activity.142 
One basis for this fear is the Patriot Act’s expansive definition of 
terrorism, which could cause the government to regard numerous 
Web sites with suspicion.143  Once law enforcement authorities certify 
that an Internet researcher’s work is somehow relevant to an 
investigation, little prevents them from determining that Web sites 
discussing Al Qaeda, for example, seek to influence national policy by 
intimidation or coercion.144  Less than three months after September 
11, then-Attorney General John Ashcroft went a step further by 
suggesting that people who criticize the “War on Terror” only would 
be helping the enemies of the United States.145 
Another basis for this fear of arrest is the “technology-neutral” 
definition of the pen register itself, which may enable investigators to 
use inappropriately sophisticated and intrusive data-collection devices 
as they monitor the Internet.146  At the same time, another section of 
the Patriot Act grants immigration officials and various other 
authorities easy access to terrorist-related surveillance data.147  Thus, 
                                                          
 142. See Nehf, supra note 120, at 23-24 (noting that data collection allows 
businesses or law enforcement to judge people on the basis of scattered information, 
and that this often leads to a harmful and negative mischaracterization of a person). 
 143. See Patriot Act § 802, 115 Stat. at 376 (defining domestic terrorism as acts 
dangerous to human life, which are a violation of the criminal laws of the United 
States, and are intended “to intimidate or coerce a civilian population” or “influence 
the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion”). 
 144. See CHANG, supra note 49 (arguing that law enforcement could construe the 
Patriot Act’s definition of domestic terrorism broadly to justify surveillance of 
environmental activists, anti-abortion activists, and political organizations that 
question government policies). 
 145. See Testimony of Attorney General John Ashcroft Before the Senate Comm. 
on the Judiciary (Dec. 6, 2001) (advising all those who “scare peace-loving people 
with phantoms of lost liberty” that such statements “only aid terrorists” and “erode 
our national unity and diminish our resolve”), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
ag/testimony/2001/1206transcriptsenatejudiciarycommittee.htm. 
 146. See SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS, supra note 39 (noting that the pen 
register/trap and trace devices have such “broad, technology-neutral” definitions that 
law enforcement agents may not always know whether a given device fits the statutory 
definition of these instruments); see also CHANG, supra note 49 (stating that the 
vague language of the pen register provisions implicitly permit the use of Carnivore 
(now called DCS-1000), a controversial surveillance tool that may collect Web pages 
visited and other content).  But see Haglund, supra note 11, at 141 (arguing that 
criticism of DCS-1000 is inaccurate, because this device collects only source and 
destination information, as opposed to specific terms in the Web address, when 
operating in pen register mode). 
 147. See Patriot Act § 203, 115 Stat. at 281 (stating that investigators may share any 
foreign intelligence information they obtain from a criminal investigation with any 
“Federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or 
22
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol13/iss2/3
2005] WEB-SURFING IN CHILLY WATERS 375 
under this system of potentially reckless surveillance and liberalized 
data-sharing, it seems that officials will possess almost limitless power 
to scrutinize a person’s Web addresses.148  As with the new definition 
of terrorism, these concerns have a basis in reality: the Patriot Act 
already has enabled the government to arrest scholars whose activities 
may or may not indicate a true terrorist threat.149 
The infamous “nationwide service” provision of the Patriot Act 
provides the third major way that law enforcement may abuse the pen 
register to the detriment of Internet users.150  Because it allows 
investigators to use a single pen register order to monitor Internet 
usage anywhere in the United States, commentators fear that it 
unconstitutionally authorizes the equivalent of blank warrants.151  
This procedural simplification arguably strips away some of the 
judiciary’s power and legitimacy.152  This system of virtually 
unchecked surveillance may scare Internet researchers into confining 
their scholarship to “safe” topics.153  Such an environment further 
discourages explorations of Islam or terrorism at a time when these 
constitutionally protected activities are already coming under fire.154 
                                                          
national security official” in order to assist that official in her own duties); see also 
Surveillance Powers: A Chart, ACLU Online Archives (2002) (explaining that, prior 
to the passage of the Patriot Act, much of the information gleaned from surveillance 
procedures was unavailable to non-relevant law enforcement authorities), at 
http://www.aclu.org/Privacy/Privacy.cfm?ID=13601&c=130 (last visited Apr. 9, 
2005). 
 148. See Evans, supra note 7, at 983 (arguing that the extensive sharing of 
surveillance data among government agencies effectively erases their separate roles 
and makes them more likely to abuse their power). 
 149. See, e.g., Mussenden et al., supra note 112, at A1 (stating that Attorney 
General Ashcroft credits the Patriot Act, and particularly its data-sharing provision 
between intelligence and law enforcement, for the investigation and arrest of 
Professor Sami Al-Arian). 
 150. See Patriot Act § 216, 115 Stat. at 288-89 (amending Title 18 of the United 
States Code to authorize a court to issue a pen register/trap and trace order 
“anywhere within the United States,” as opposed to the specific jurisdiction in which 
the investigator wishes to conduct surveillance). 
 151. See Evans, supra note 7, at 978-79 (arguing that, because the Fourth 
Amendment requires the court to state with particularity the person or place to be 
searched, the “nationwide service” of pen register orders violates this constitutional 
requirement). 
 152. See id. at 978 (noting that, under the blank warrant system, the judge will be 
unable to ensure that investigators are focusing on the correct target and collecting 
data for legitimate reasons). 
 153. See Nehf, supra note 120, at 11 (stating that limitless surveillance and data-
collection evoke images of Bentham’s Panopticon, which allowed full surveillance of 
hundreds of prisoners simultaneously by a single authority).  Knowledge of 
surveillance, whether from the Panopticon or modern methods of data collection, 
curtails free will and shapes human behavior to satisfy a prescribed norm.  Id. 
 154. See AMERICAN COUNCIL OF TRUSTEES AND ALUMNI, supra note 72, at 6 
(criticizing American colleges and universities for adding courses on Islamic and 
Asian cultures, instead of additional courses on “the civilization under attack,” after 
the September 11 events). 
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III. “FIXING” THE PEN REGISTER STATUTE: FEARS AND SOLUTIONS 
Given the vagueness of the Patriot Act’s definition of the pen 
register and the problematic ways in which this definition interacts 
with other Patriot Act provisions, a legally justiciable chill on an 
Internet user’s freedom of inquiry certainly exists.155  This section 
proposes ways to correct the constitutional defects in the pen register 
legislation while preserving law enforcement’s ability to combat crime 
and safeguard national security.156 
The drafters of the Patriot Act’s expanded pen register definition 
probably presumed that the phrase “routing, addressing, and 
signaling information” would exclude content from Internet 
surveillance.157  The Justice Department believes that this is the case, 
and it notes that the pen register law explicitly forbids the collection 
of “content.”158  Nevertheless, because the definition of Internet 
content is no clearer than the concept of Internet addressing 
information, the argument is circular and does nothing to clarify the 
law’s ambiguity.159 
An obvious way to save this provision from its own vagueness is to 
define one or both of these terms in technology-specific language.160  
Much of the confusion would disappear, for instance, if the pen 
                                                          
 155. See Dolich, supra note 99, at 189-90 (noting that, though the law of standing 
and judicially cognizable injury is still taking shape, a regulation containing a veiled 
threat to the exercise of free speech rights may pose a legally actionable injury). 
 156. See generally LEVY, supra note 8 (stating that the U.S. government’s most 
important obligation is the protection of life from “domestic and foreign predators” 
while safeguarding civil liberties to as great a degree as possible). 
 157. See Anti-Terrorism Investigations and the Fourth Amendment After 
September 11: Where and When Can the Government Go to Prevent Terrorist 
Attacks? Oversight Hearing Before the House Constitution Subcommittee (May 20, 
2003) (opening statement of Steve Chabot, Chairman, House Constitution 
Subcommittee) (noting that the Patriot Act limits the government’s pen register 
surveillance powers to pure “addressing” information while explicitly barring the 
collection of content), at http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/printers/108th/ 
87238.PDF (on file with the American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & 
the Law). 
 158. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3127(3) (stating that the addressing information that the 
pen register collects “shall not include the contents of any communication”); see also 
SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS, supra note 39 (stating that Title III of the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, and not the pen register 
statute, allows the seizure of Internet contents). 
 159. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510(8) (defining content, as the term appears in the pen 
register statute, as “any information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning” 
of “any wire, oral, or electronic communication”); see also Kerr, supra note 21, at 647 
(noting that the Patriot Act’s pen register provisions represent a “missed opportunity” 
to clarify the foggy distinction between addressing and content information in 
human-to-computer communications). 
 160. See Kerr, supra note 21, at 647 (noting that the statutory definition of 
“contents” is unacceptably vague and has not changed since 1986, many years before 
the arrival of the Internet). 
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register definition stated that addressing information, in the Internet 
context, includes only “source and destination information.”161  This 
relatively simple solution presumably would satisfy scholars who fear 
that surveillance of their Internet research will reveal too much about 
their thoughts or interests.162 
In the absence of changes to the statutory definitions, Internet 
researchers might feel less fearful of intrusive surveillance if it were 
more difficult to obtain a pen register order.163  Currently, 
investigators need only state the crime under investigation.164  It is 
very likely that more speech and privacy protection would be available 
if pen register applicants had to show probable cause and obtain a 
warrant.165  Moreover, even those who question the assumption that a 
probable cause showing would increase privacy seem to accept that 
this evidentiary requirement would not hamper law enforcement.166 
Conditioning the granting of a pen register order upon a showing 
of probable cause is a more drastic proposal than it may appear 
because it necessitates overruling the Supreme Court decision in 
Smith, which deals with the pen register.167  Judges, however, never 
have embraced fully the notion that transactional information, such as 
telephone numbers and Web addresses, deserve such minimal privacy 
protection.168  In addition, commentators note that the Smith 
                                                          
 161. See Haglund, supra note 11, at 141 (explaining that any surveillance device 
that limits its collection to Internet source and destination information could retrieve 
no letters, words, or search terms from a Web address beyond the Internet protocol, 
such as yahoo.com). 
 162. See Surveillance Under the “USA/Patriot” Act, supra note 5 (arguing that a 
list of Web addresses that a person visits displays intimate information about a 
person’s thoughts and identity, much like the title of a book that a person wishes to 
read). 
 163. See Evans, supra note 7, at 977-78 (arguing that the current “relevant to an 
ongoing criminal investigation” standard of proof is extremely low and has the 
unpleasant effect of disrupting the lives of many innocent people with which the 
government has no interest). 
 164. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3123(b)(1)(D) (requiring that the contents of the order 
shall specify “a statement of the offense to which the information likely to be 
obtained by the pen register or trap and trace device relates”). 
 165. See Solove, supra note 125, at 1162-63 (arguing that the Fourth Amendment’s 
warrant requirement, issued upon a finding of probable cause, helps prevent the 
government from abusing its surveillance powers by minimizing its collection powers 
to only essential information thereby ensuring that a specific person is the target of 
the surveillance, and by calling for a neutral and detached magistrate to authorize the 
surveillance). 
 166. See Kerr, supra note 21, at 639 (conceding that a “specific and articulable 
facts” requirement would not significantly hamper law enforcement, even if this 
evidentiary requirement protects privacy only “on paper”). 
 167. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 744 (reasoning that a person has no legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the telephone number she dials because using a telephone 
requires conveying that number to the telephone company and thus “assum[ing] the 
risk” of disclosure). 
 168. See id. at 748 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing that a telephone number 
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holding is antiquated and increasingly unpopular.169  Finally, Smith 
seems to go against most people’s intuitive conception of privacy.170  
For these reasons, and because modern telephonic communications 
resemble Internet communications, overruling Smith statutorily may 
be appropriate and even desirable.171 
Because the Patriot Act’s definition of domestic terrorism is as 
sweeping as the definitions of content or addressing, it too requires 
revision to protect the Internet researcher from undeserved 
surveillance.172  A meaningful and appropriately precise definition of 
domestic terrorism should not draw within its scope potentially 
ambiguous activities, such as those intended to “intimidate or coerce a 
civilian population”173 or “influence the policy of a government by 
intimidation or coercion.”174  Thus, Congress should repeal the two 
subparts above and leave the third provision, which describes the 
malicious nature of true terrorism more accurately.175 
Another solution involves placing clear time limits on the duration 
of every clause of the pen register law and the intra-governmental 
data-sharing provisions of the Patriot Act.176  These Congressionally 
                                                          
contains an element of content because, like a full conversation, it could reveal “the 
most intimate details of a person’s life” by displaying the identities of the caller and 
the people called). 
 169. See Solove, supra note 125, at 1137-38 (observing that Smith has received a 
great deal of criticism over the years because its holding is based on simplistic notions 
of privacy that allow electronic monitoring to become increasingly intrusive as 
surveillance technology evolves). 
 170. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 748 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (expressing doubt as to 
whether “there are any who would be happy to have broadcast to the world” a record 
of the telephone numbers they have dialed); see also Haglund, supra note 11, at 137 
(observing that despite the Supreme Court’s position, people generally regard 
addressing information, such as Internet addresses, as private). 
 171. See Haglund, supra note 11, at 147 (explaining that the technology in use to 
route telephone calls increasingly resembles the packet-based technology in use to 
transmit computer communications).  Because this new form of telephone 
technology, like computer communications, blurs the distinction between addressing 
and content information, a pen register order may soon be as inappropriate for 
telephone calls as it is for the Internet.  Id. 
 172. See CHANG, supra note 49 (cautioning that until Congress clarifies the 
definition of terrorism, the public needs a mechanism that closely monitors the types 
of organizations and activists that the government selects for surveillance pursuant to 
this definition). 
 173. Patriot Act § 802, 115 Stat. at 376. 
 174. Id. 
 175. See id. (providing an amendment to the United States Code that defines 
terrorism as activities intended to “affect the conduct of a government by mass 
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping”). 
 176. See Ann Harrison, Behind the USA Patriot Act (Nov. 5, 2001) (noting that 
while certain portions of the Patriot Act expire in 2005, the pen register law and the 
provision allowing the sharing of grand jury information will continue indefinitely), 
at http://www.alternet.org/story.html?StoryID=11854?. 
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determined expiration dates, known as “sunset laws,” 177 may be the 
path of least resistance.  Sunset laws preserve the Patriot Act’s 
statutory language and all underlying judicial decisions while ensuring 
that any resulting incursions on civil liberties last no longer than 
national security concerns require.178 
On the negative side, however, sunset provisions raise troublesome 
questions concerning the acceptable duration of burdens on basic 
constitutional rights.179  More specifically, the comprehensive sunset 
solution fails to address the extent to which investigators may monitor 
Web browsing.180  A comprehensive set of sunset provisions, however, 
would at least provide Congress with an opportunity to reevaluate the 
Patriot Act and draft a more efficient and narrowly tailored law from 
scratch.181 
A final proposal involves leaving the pen register law and other 
parts of the Patriot Act untouched while raising public awareness of 
the real-life threat these provisions pose to First Amendment rights.182  
The government could help by reversing course and sharing pre- and 
post-Patriot Act data-collection statistics with the public.183  University 
leaders also could raise awareness of civil liberty issues by 
encouraging, rather than stifling, inquiry into government policies.184  
                                                          
 177. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1450 (7th ed. 1999) (defining a sunset law as a 
“statute under which a governmental agency or program automatically terminates at 
the end of a fixed period unless it is formally renewed”). 
 178. See LEVY, supra note 8 (praising sunset laws as a means of ensuring that 
drastic legislative measures are temporary and as a means of forcing the government 
to justify periodically any continuing intrusions on civil liberties). 
 179. See Jacob R. Lilly, Note, National Security at What Price?: A Look Into Civil 
Liberty Concerns in the Information Age Under the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 and 
a Proposed Constitutional Test for Future Legislation, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
447, 463 (2003) (observing that sunset provisions are powerless to prevent violations 
while the questionable law is in effect and therefore provide little consolation to the 
person whose constitutional rights suffer during this period). 
 180. See Kerr, supra note 21, at 639 (explaining that the pen register amendments 
actually enhanced privacy protections on the Internet by requiring a court order for 
surveillance, where quite possibly no authorization was necessary before). 
 181. See Richards & Calvert, supra note 109, at 208 (quoting ACLU President 
Nadine Strossen, who argues that the Patriot Act, as a whole, is not narrowly tailored 
to fight terrorism because “the vast majority of its provisions, even on their face, really 
had nothing to do with terrorism” or deal only with criminal law enforcement in 
general).  Many members of Congress might not vote for the Patriot Act today if they 
received a chance to reconsider their decision.  Id. at 207. 
 182. See id. at 215 (pointing out that people are generally indifferent to the 
constitutional rights of others until they believe that their own rights may be at stake). 
 183. See ACLU, 265 F. Supp.2d at 34-35 (denying the ACLU’s Freedom of 
Information Act request that the Justice Department produce statistics revealing how 
often and under what circumstances the government has used the Patriot Act). 
 184. See Bird & Brandt, supra note 10, at 459 (reporting that college presidents 
often have disavowed controversial statements by faculty members and suggesting that 
these administrators fear experiencing public criticism for endorsing unpopular 
views). 
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Widespread public apathy of both the average citizen and the Internet 
scholar damages First Amendment safeguards more than terrorism or 
the legislation Congress enacts to combat it.185 
CONCLUSION 
The Patriot Act’s amendments to the pen register statute, and 
particularly the expanded pen register definition, burden intellectual 
freedom by simplifying law enforcement’s ability to monitor and 
record Web addresses.  The history of pen register use and Congress’ 
rushed passage of the amendments suggest that this tool should not 
extend to the Internet without a higher evidentiary showing.186  
Because the precise connection between Web browsing and terrorism 
remains unclear, allowing virtually unregulated collection of Internet 
addresses “burn[s] the house to roast the pig.”187  National security 
concerns seem to overshadow civil liberties under such a scheme, and 
this runs counter to the spirit and tradition of American law.188 
Textual modifications to the Patriot Act or a comprehensive sunset 
plan may lighten the burden on freedom of Web-based inquiry.189  In 
the meantime, the academic world can and should nurture the 
exploration and debate of controversial ideas.190  Tolerance of new 
perspectives and the desire for legislation embodying that tolerance, 
however, are of paramount importance and must come solely from 
the individual.191 
 
                                                          
 185. See Richards & Calvert, supra note 109, at 241 (opining that the greatest 
menace to free speech is too little awareness of and interest in other people’s rights to 
express their ideas). 
 186. See Evans, supra note 7, at 988 (noting that because the Patriot Act provides 
no specific guidelines governing how investigators should avoid capturing content 
with an Internet pen register order, greater collaboration between the Attorney 
General and the FBI is necessary in this area). 
 187. See Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957) (striking down a statute 
banning the sale of lewd books to all members of the general public, and cautioning 
that the State’s legitimate desire to “promote the general welfare” does not justify 
legislation that “burn[s] the house to roast the pig”). 
 188. See Richards & Calvert, supra note 109, at 207-08 (noting Nadine Strossen’s 
observation that, because no provision in the Bill of Rights explicitly states that 
constitutional rights are subject to restriction during a time of war, the Constitution 
contains a “presumption in favor of freedom”). 
 189. See Lilly, supra note 179, at 469 (proposing, as a means of making the Patriot 
Act more constitutionally sound, a sunset clause lasting until the national security 
crisis ends or until the end of a two-year period, whichever date comes first). 
 190. See Bird & Brandt, supra note 10, at 432 (noting that universities are uniquely 
able to incubate the most advanced scientific, artistic, and political ideas because of 
their “insularity” from popular opinion and economic concerns). 
 191. See Richards & Calvert, supra note 109, at 202 (calling upon everyone to 
“look through the substance” of opinions they despise and recognize that free speech 
principles cannot apply to themselves unless they apply equally to others). 
28
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol13/iss2/3
